Takeaways
#- Basso sized positions from both planned stop risk and volatility, choosing the smaller result in his example.
- He diversified across markets, indicators and time horizons, allowing different systems to hold different directional positions.
- He separated his views on economic policy from a trading process based on price signals.
- He treated awareness of his own reactions as necessary even when much of the trading process was computerized.
Tom Basso did not need a single bullish or bearish forecast to describe his portfolio on April 17, 2025. He told Jason Perz that he was long some stock indexes and short Dow futures. Some of his strategies had recently reversed upward after participating in the preceding decline. Others were positioned differently.
That mixed exposure was deliberate. Basso used strategies with different indicators and time horizons, so they would not all respond to a turn at the same moment. He wanted a process for rising, falling and sideways markets, with position sizes that kept any one instrument from dominating the result.
Equal dollars did not mean equal bets
Basso’s explanation began with a problem in ordinary diversification: two positions with the same dollar allocation could carry very different risks. The more volatile instrument could end up driving the portfolio even when the account appeared spread across several markets.
He therefore started with the distance between entry and the planned stop. That established a per-share or per-contract loss estimate. He could then calculate how many units corresponded to the amount of account equity he intended to risk.
In his example, that risk budget was 0.35% of total equity. The contract count was the result of the calculation, rather than a round number chosen first. A Dow futures position and a Treasury futures position could have different sizes while representing comparable planned bets.
Basso added a second calculation based on average true range, or ATR. He described an initial volatility allowance of about 2% of equity per position, then chose whichever of the risk-based and volatility-based calculations produced the smaller position.
Those were parameters in his own process. He also considered margin and aggregate portfolio risk and volatility. His concern was that an unusually active holding could overwhelm the rest of the account, leaving several other positions that contributed little to the outcome.
Diversification extended to the trading system
Basso traced his trend-following approach to chart study while working as a chemical engineer. With little time to trade during the day, he examined markets after the close and looked for a common feature behind large moves. That work led him toward longer-term breakouts.
Position sizing came alongside the entry method. He said it helped moderate the drawdowns while allowing the strategy to remain involved in substantial trends. He later diversified by market, indicator and time period.
Perz described combining systems that could perform differently in trending and mean-reverting conditions. Basso agreed with the objective: one strategy might offset some losses in another. He did not claim that the combination made every day profitable. He explicitly said he had not achieved that.
The mixed long and short positions at the time of the interview illustrated the approach. A faster system could reverse while a slower one stayed with its existing trend, without requiring Basso to force both into the same market opinion.
Price signals mattered more than the explanation
Basso distinguished his interest in economic policy from his trading decisions. He could have opinions as a citizen, but his trading process responded to price. A persuasive explanation for a move might arrive well after the move itself.
He described using Donchian channels, Keltner channels and Bollinger Bands together to distinguish ordinary price movement from a breakout. The indicators responded differently to changes in range, volatility and average price. His interest was in how their different calculations could complement one another.
The point was that his entry and exit process had defined signals, rather than requiring a fresh explanation of the news each day.
The operator could still override the system
When Perz asked what Basso would tell a younger trader, Basso returned to sizing. He observed that recent price bars had become several times larger than during quieter conditions. Holding the old position size would not preserve the old level of exposure.
His second priority was awareness of his own mental state. Computerization did not eliminate that problem: he remained the person who could press the button or override the rules. He wanted to notice frustration, excitement or an urge to take a discretionary action before those reactions changed the process.
Perz described using a journal to check for the same risks, including revenge trading or bypassing a system. Their conversation ended with execution and self-observation, after a detailed discussion of the calculations that made the intended positions manageable.
Questions and answers
#Questions answered in the original 2025-04-17 episode.
How did Basso determine the size of a position?
He calculated units from the distance between entry and the planned stop, using an example risk allowance of 0.35% of equity. He also calculated a size from ATR-based volatility with an initial allowance of about 2% of equity, then used the smaller result.
Why could his portfolio be long some indexes and short another?
His systems used different indicators and time horizons. A faster strategy could reverse while another retained its previous position, so he did not require every system to express one market forecast.
Did combining strategies eliminate losing days?
No. Basso wanted gains in some strategies to offset losses in others, but explicitly said he had not reached the goal of an aggregate profit every day.
Adapted by Stock Market TV Editorial from the original video. Source date: . Article published: .