Takeaways
#- Lundgren saw an internal correction beneath the largest indexes, with longer-term gauges still in risk-on territory.
- His historical crisis comparison showed how deteriorating gauges could change his response to an oversold market.
- He evaluated average winners and losers alongside win rate, then adjusted activity and size as trading results changed.
- Swing trades provided tactical exposure around a core portfolio whose long-term holdings faced stricter fundamental and relative-strength requirements.
The largest stocks were obscuring a correction, David Lundgren told Stock Market TV’s December 17, 2024 Morning Show. The S&P 500 and Nasdaq 100 were near their highs, but the equal-weighted market looked different. In his assessment, the question was whether that internal weakness was occurring within a healthy longer-term trend or signaling a more serious deterioration.
Lundgren’s risk gauges still favored the former. He said the long- and medium-term readings remained in risk-on territory, while the shorter-term reading reflected the pullback already underway.
Equal weighting revealed the weakness
Lundgren pointed to RSP, the Invesco S&P 500 Equal Weight ETF, as a way to see the correction that the largest stocks had helped conceal. He also described oversold breadth measures beneath the indexes.
His own framework followed roughly 2,800 stocks across sizes and sectors with equal weighting. Its time horizons were longer than those of many traders: quarterly charts for the long term, monthly charts for the medium term and weekly charts for the short term.
Those gauges were intended to help him assess the setting for a pullback. Strong readings did not give him a timetable for an explosive advance. They made him more willing to buy technically sound stocks during weakness.
The financial-crisis comparison showed what would change his response
Lundgren walked through historical charts from before and during the global financial crisis. In that sequence, his medium-term gauge weakened while the market was still near its highs. As the readings deteriorated further, the same oversold conditions that had previously offered buying opportunities became reasons for caution.
He contrasted that sequence with his December assessment. Steve Strazza emphasized that Lundgren was describing a correction already visible beneath the surface, rather than predicting that a new dip was about to begin.
Lundgren said he still required a stock to have an established technical structure before buying it. His favorable view of the broader environment did not remove that requirement.
Win rate was feedback, not the whole scorecard
The discussion also addressed what happened when individual positions stopped working. Lundgren urged attention to the size of average winners and losers alongside the frequency of each. A high percentage of profitable positions during a bull market could give a misleading impression of personal skill.
He tracked his results as information about the environment. When they deteriorated, he reduced the number of trades and position sizes, backed away from swing trading and could begin considering shorts. He wanted decisions to respond to that evidence rather than to frustration over a loss.
He also diversified by entry pattern. Established advances, emerging turns and carefully defined unattractive-looking charts gave him different ways to participate. Relying on one successful pattern alone would leave the portfolio exposed if that pattern stopped working.
Swing trades allowed him to adjust exposure around the core
Within his long equity allocation, Lundgren described a roughly 90% allocation to established trends and 10% to exploratory positions beginning to turn. In favorable conditions, he could add swing trades worth up to another 20%, taking long exposure as high as 120%.
That additional exposure gave him something tactical to remove when conditions changed, without repeatedly trading around the long-term holdings he hoped to keep through the cycle. His shorter trades were still measured in weeks.
The selection criteria differed. For long-term holdings, he wanted profitable businesses, above-average returns on capital, low leverage and relative strength. Those requirements supported his search for potential multiyear compounders. For swing trades, he was willing to pursue a price move without requiring the same fundamental profile or established relative leadership.
He was also watching a change within his market-cap groups. The middle quintile had recently become the strongest in his risk-gauge work. He regarded that improvement beyond the largest companies as evidence worth following while the headline indexes told a narrower story.
Questions and answers
#Questions answered in the original 2024-12-17 episode.
What time frames did Lundgren use for his risk gauges?
He described quarterly charts as long term, monthly charts as medium term and weekly charts as short term, consistent with his longer-horizon trend-following approach.
Why did he look at the equal-weighted market?
Strong performance from the largest stocks could conceal weakness elsewhere. RSP and his broader equal-weighted stock universe helped him assess that internal correction.
How did he reduce exposure when results weakened?
He could cut trade frequency and position size, pull back on swing trading and consider shorts. Swing positions also let him adjust additional exposure without repeatedly trading around the longer-term core.
Adapted by Stock Market TV Editorial from the original video. Source date: . Article published: .