Takeaways
#- Strazza removed leverage and reviewed whether he would buy each existing position at its current price.
- McLaughlin preferred buying more time for Kinder Morgan, while the two traders weighed near-the-money versus higher-strike calls.
- An American Battery options gain reversed into a loss; holding through a Rigetti pullback produced a much better outcome.
- McLaughlin used short call spreads to help offset a sideways market, distinguishing that approach from crash protection.
Sean McLaughlin had heard a warning in a trader's request for help: the trader was losing money that could not afford to be lost. On the November 11, 2025 Open Bar, McLaughlin and Steve Strazza began with the financial pressure behind a trade before turning to charts and options chains.
Both had experience trying to make the market deliver money on a personal schedule. Strazza recalled trading with a mortgage payment in mind. McLaughlin argued that bills needed a source of funding independent of whether the next position worked.
Their discussion then moved to a harder distinction. A trader might be comfortable risking the original premium yet find it difficult to watch a large unrealized gain disappear. McLaughlin brought two trades that had tested exactly that choice.
A portfolio reset created room for new decisions
Strazza said he had removed his margin balance and raised cash after previously carrying substantial leverage. He reviewed the account position by position, asking whether he would buy each holding at its current price.
When the answer was no, he sold it. That left him free to add exposure elsewhere if a better setup developed.
McLaughlin connected that practical reset to the earlier discussion about stress. Taking time away did not require abandoning trading permanently. It could mean rebuilding savings, securing income to cover expenses or waiting until a loss no longer threatened ordinary life.
He also separated discomfort with losing money from being financially unable to lose it. He disliked losses too. His concern was whether the account had become responsible for meeting obligations it could not reliably fund.
Kinder Morgan offered a choice about time and strike
Energy stocks were attracting both traders. Strazza had already participated in Exxon Mobil's move and preferred looking for another entry in a stock that had not advanced as far. Kinder Morgan's consolidation following a longer-term trend reversal caught his attention.
He saw the shares reclaiming a short-term anchored VWAP, but he did not yet have confirmation that the entire consolidation was resolving higher.
McLaughlin thought relatively inexpensive implied volatility made buying more time attractive. He suggested looking at June options rather than relying on January contracts to capture a quick breakout.
They also differed on strike selection. McLaughlin leaned toward June $27 calls, quoted around $2 to $2.05, because Kinder Morgan was not usually a large mover. Strazza preferred considering the $30 strike, around $1, for greater exposure to a decisive resolution higher.
Those were alternatives under discussion. The choice depended on how much time and movement each trader expected, with the stock still working through the consolidation.
The same holding plan produced opposite experiences
McLaughlin bought November $5 calls in American Battery Technology on September 23 for roughly $1. The shares later traded above $11 and the position developed a substantial unrealized gain.
He tried to hold for a larger winner. Instead, the stock reversed sharply. He eventually exited with the shares around $4.20 and reported a loss of about $100 on the trade.
Rigetti provided the other side. He had bought October $17 calls on September 11 and held through a late-September pullback. The shares subsequently advanced again, and he exited on October 17 with what he described as one of his better gains of the year.
He corrected an initial claim that Rigetti was his largest winner: a bearish Simply Good Foods trade had done better. The point of the comparison was the difficulty of knowing, during a pullback, which winner would recover and which would collapse.
Sideways markets created a different options problem
McLaughlin also described selling short-dated S&P 500 call spreads against a predominantly bullish book. Directional calls could lose value when the market stalled even without a major decline.
The short call premium had helped cushion that kind of environment. He distinguished it from a crash hedge and acknowledged that the spreads could move against him when the index rose.
For longer swing trades, he was often taking partial profits near chart resistance rather than automatically selling when an option doubled. For some speculative positions, he still used the quicker exit. Holding for an outlier gain and locking in a smaller profit remained different choices with different costs.
Questions and answers
#Questions answered in the original 2025-11-11 episode.
Why did McLaughlin consider June calls for Kinder Morgan?
He thought implied volatility made the extra time relatively affordable, and the stock still had a consolidation to work through. More time reduced dependence on an immediate breakout, though it did not guarantee one.
What did the American Battery and Rigetti trades illustrate?
Both involved holding calls through uncertainty in pursuit of a larger gain. American Battery reversed into a reported loss, while Rigetti recovered from a pullback and became one of McLaughlin’s better winners.
Why sell call spreads against a bullish options portfolio?
McLaughlin wanted short premium to help cushion the effect of a stalled market on his directional positions. He said the spreads could lose when the index rose and did not describe them as a complete crash hedge.
Adapted by Stock Market TV Editorial from the original video. Source date: . Article published: .