Takeaways

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  • The July MRUS short calls expired before the stock moved above $65, leaving McLaughlin with his December calls.
  • TTWO’s short calls also expired worthless, but the remaining position was closed at a loss after the stock broke $230.
  • He tightened QS management as its August expiration approached and raised the AG stock stop to $7.75.
  • He treated a low VIX as a condition that could persist, rather than a signal that volatility had to spike immediately.

Sean McLaughlin had reached a useful stage in his Merus trade. The July calls he had sold were gone, and the December calls he wanted to own were still in the portfolio. But on the July 24, 2025 Options Jam Session, he also closed a Take-Two position that had passed through a similar transition and still lost money.

The two trades showed why he reviewed the remaining exposure after a short option expired. Collecting that premium changed the cost of the position. The stock still had to cooperate.

Merus moved after the July expiration

McLaughlin had entered the MRUS calendar in early June, buying December $65 calls and selling July $65 calls. He liked the longer-term opportunity but considered the December options expensive. Selling the nearer expiration helped finance them while expressing his expectation that the stock would take time to move.

The July calls expired worthless on July 18. Merus subsequently moved above $65, leaving him with the December calls and no remaining short call against them.

The timing mattered. Had the stock crossed the strike earlier, McLaughlin said he would probably have closed the calendar for a profit, but with less upside than he had hoped to capture. Instead, the move arrived after the short leg disappeared. He was still holding the long calls and identified $52 in the stock as his stop reference.

Take-Two lost ground after its short leg expired

Take-Two followed a less favorable path. McLaughlin had opened the TTWO position in mid-February, selling April $240 calls and buying August $250 calls. The different strikes made it a diagonal spread.

The April calls expired worthless. A subsequent advance in the stock did not hold, however, and Take-Two closed below $230 on July 23. McLaughlin exited the remaining August calls the following morning for $2.50. His net cost for the overall position had been $7.50.

The expired short call had reduced the original expense, but it had not protected the remaining calls from a stalled stock and a shrinking calendar. He closed the position when the stock broke his level rather than waiting for the August expiration.

Hudbay Minerals was another completed loss in the review. He had bought January $12.50 calls for $0.75 and sold them for $0.60 after HBM closed below $10. That was a smaller loss, governed by a different chart level, but it required the same decision to release capital from a trade that was no longer behaving as intended.

Profits changed the QuantumScape plan

QuantumScape had almost exhausted his patience before it moved. The August calls, purchased in January, had become nearly worthless by late spring. McLaughlin had initially sized that position to tolerate losing its premium.

The rally beginning in late June changed what he was managing. He now had a winner with an approaching expiration. His new closing-price stop in QS was $8, and he planned to tighten his approach as August began, potentially using recent three- to five-day lows and responding intraday.

First Majestic Silver offered another variation. He had bought back the July $9 calls for $0.05 before expiration, leaving December $9 calls open. Adding that repurchase to the original $0.84 net debit brought his cost to $0.89. He raised his stock stop to $7.75 as AG advanced, with the nearby gap helping define the chart risk.

In Rigetti, he had sold half of a January bull call spread for $4.30 after paying $2.40 per spread. That recovered much of the money committed to the two halves, but not all of it. He distinguished taking substantial money off the table from having a cost-free remaining position.

Low volatility was not a countdown

McLaughlin began the session by discussing a quiet VIX. He regarded volatility as asymmetrical: a spike often retreats quickly, while a low reading can persist.

That made a simple bet on an immediate volatility jump less appealing to him. His preference was for directional option positions that could benefit if the underlying moved and, potentially, if implied volatility rose. The stock thesis, the time remaining and the exit level still determined what he did with each trade.

Questions and answers

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Questions answered in the original 2025-07-24 episode.

Why did McLaughlin use a calendar in Merus?

He wanted December $65 calls but considered them expensive and expected the stock to move slowly. Selling July calls at the same strike helped finance the longer-dated calls.

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Why did he close the Take-Two trade?

TTWO closed below his $230 reference after its advance stalled. He sold the remaining August $250 calls for $2.50 against an overall net position cost of $7.50.

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How did the QuantumScape rally change his risk management?

He had initially accepted the possibility of losing the option premium. Once QS rallied, he set an $8 closing-price stop and planned tighter management as the August expiration approached.

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Adapted by Stock Market TV Editorial from the original video. Source date: . Article published: .