Takeaways
#- Thompson saw technology's decline as exposing breadth weaknesses that the index's largest stocks had previously masked.
- Discretionary-to-staples and high-yield-to-Treasury ratios had weakened before the broad selloff.
- Housing and industrials supported a possible growth-scare thesis, which made bond diversification relevant to him.
- Washed-out short-term breadth kept him from chasing a broad-market short immediately after the decline.
Larry Thompson brought twenty charts to Thompson's Two Cents on October 10, 2025, and few immediate trade ideas. The market had just suffered a sharp decline, and his first task was to determine whether one bad session would become a more persistent change in trend.
He began with the weekly S&P 500 chart. The larger advance was still the context, but participation beneath it had become less convincing. Technology's strength had allowed the capitalization-weighted index to keep rising while other parts of the market weakened. Once technology fell too, those earlier divergences mattered more.
Several measures of risk appetite had weakened first
Thompson compared consumer discretionary stocks with staples on an equal-weight basis. The ratio had already suffered a large daily decline earlier in the week and then followed through below its 50-day moving average. That made the setup less reassuring to him than the August pullback, when the same follow-through had not appeared.
High-yield corporate bonds relative to Treasuries supplied another warning. That ratio had not confirmed the stock market's new highs and was now back near levels last seen in May. Thompson interpreted it as a shift toward safety in credit markets.
High-beta stocks had been a holdout. Their relative strength lasted longer, in part because technology was such an important component. When that ratio finally fell, it brought a major source of market leadership into line with the weakening signals elsewhere.
Thompson did not say each earlier divergence should have caused an investor to abandon stocks. Before the decline, the overall weight of evidence had still favored an uptrend. The warnings were more useful as reasons to scrutinize new exposure than as a claim that the exact selloff could have been predicted.
Housing and industrials made the growth question harder to ignore
Industrials had been moving sideways while lagging technology on a relative basis. Thompson had been watching whether they could break out. Their failure to do so added to his concerns.
Home construction was more troubling. Using ITB, he pointed to the possibility of a large topping formation and compared housing's behavior with semiconductors and the S&P 500. Earlier in the year, housing weakness had preceded broader weakness. After the lows, technology and the index had recovered first, with housing following. Now housing was deteriorating again.
He saw that as a possible growth warning, with interest rates potentially too restrictive for the sector. It was a thesis to test through further price action, not a conclusion that every part of the market had already entered a prolonged decline.
Energy also fell during the session. Thompson thought that behavior was more consistent with concern about growth than a fresh inflation shock. That distinction mattered to his view of bonds. If slowing growth brought yields down, bonds could provide diversification at a time when stocks were under pressure. He already held some exposure and was pleased with its behavior that day.
Weak breadth could limit a fresh short
The same breadth work that made Thompson cautious about buying also restrained his appetite to short the broad market after the drop. Across the S&P large-, mid- and small-cap universes, relatively few stocks remained above their 20-day moving averages. He regarded those readings as approaching washout territory.
Much of the short-term weakness had therefore already happened beneath the index. He thought there might be more room in technology or in individual stocks still near highs with clear risk references, but he was not rushing to sell the entire market short.
For new longs, Thompson wanted strength after a dip and a level against which to define the trade. A lower price by itself was insufficient. For further reductions, he wanted downside follow-through.
His next week would be spent watching whether former resistance could hold as support and whether the large daily decline proved exceptional or repeated. Those answers would determine when he moved beyond protecting the portfolio and started adding again.
Questions and answers
#Questions answered in the original 2025-10-10 episode.
Why did Thompson want more than a one-day selloff before changing his view?
On October 10, 2025, the broader trend was still up. He wanted to see whether the sharp daily move repeated or proved to be an exception, as an earlier August decline had.
Why was he cautious about shorting despite the weak charts?
His short-term breadth readings showed that much of the market had already fallen. He considered them near washout levels, reducing the appeal of chasing broad downside after the decline.
What would make him interested in buying again?
Thompson wanted to see strength emerge after the dip, ideally with former resistance holding as support and a clear price level for risk management. He was not treating every lower price as a sufficient entry.
Adapted by Stock Market TV Editorial from the original video. Source date: . Article published: .