Takeaways

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  • Schwartz treated exposure to Japanese equities and exposure to the yen as separate investment decisions.
  • His carry estimates depended on US-Japan interest-rate differences; they were expectations, not fixed fund distributions.
  • WisdomTree’s currency-hedging work began with concerns about a strong euro before expanding to Japan.
  • The quality and growth screens in IHDG and DGRW added portfolio-selection choices beyond geography or current dividend yield.

Jeremy Schwartz wanted US investors to ask a second question when they bought overseas stocks: did they also want exposure to the foreign currency? On the August 28, 2024 Morning Show, he argued that many investors made that choice without giving it much thought.

JC Parets brought up the WisdomTree Japan Hedged Equity Fund (DXJ), whose strength had caught his attention well before many US indexes returned to their highs. Schwartz used it to explain why the performance of Japanese stocks and the performance of the yen could lead to very different experiences for a dollar-based investor.

Japanese stocks and the yen were separate exposures

Schwartz contrasted DXJ with the unhedged iShares MSCI Japan ETF (EWJ). With an unhedged investment, the US investor retained the effect of the yen’s movement against the dollar alongside the Japanese equities. DXJ sought to hedge that exchange-rate exposure.

He said that distinction had been important during the yen’s weakness. The stock market could perform well in local-currency terms without producing the same return for an investor who also held the currency exposure.

DXJ’s portfolio also had an exporter tilt. WisdomTree’s August 2024 explanation of the strategy described both its globally oriented companies and its currency hedge. That design mattered when comparing different ways to own Japan.

Interest-rate differences were part of his argument

Schwartz separated the fund’s currency hedge from the leveraged carry trades that had drawn attention during the early-August market disruption. He said DXJ was not using that kind of leverage.

He described the US-Japan interest-rate differential as a source of positive carry for the hedge, estimating a four-to-five-percentage-point contribution during the preceding two years. He expected a smaller, roughly three-to-four-point benefit over the next few years. That was his outlook for the rate relationship, not a fixed payment promised by the fund.

He combined that expectation with a valuation argument. In the figures he presented, DXJ traded around 12 times earnings compared with roughly 22 times for the S&P 500. He expected hedged Japanese equities to remain competitive over a multiyear horizon.

The idea began with a strong euro

Parets assumed the yen itself had inspired WisdomTree’s early work on currency-hedged funds. Schwartz traced his thinking back to the euro instead.

He recalled looking at the firm’s international exposure when the euro was strong and asking what would happen if it weakened. European companies might benefit from a lower currency through their earnings even as a US investor’s unhedged return faced a currency headwind.

That led to the effort to separate the stock decision from the exchange-rate decision. Japan followed as another market where large currency moves could overwhelm smaller differences in stock selection.

Quality screens added another choice

Schwartz applied the same currency argument more broadly through the WisdomTree International Hedged Quality Dividend Growth Fund (IHDG). He described a developed-market portfolio emphasizing profitability and growth while hedging currencies.

That screen could produce a different country mix from the one he would choose for a standalone country view. He said IHDG was somewhat underweight Japan, where cash-heavy balance sheets had contributed to lower profitability ratios. He saw increasing dividends and buybacks as part of the change underway there.

For US stocks, he discussed the WisdomTree U.S. Quality Dividend Growth Fund (DGRW). Its purpose was not to chase the highest current yield. He emphasized profitable companies with growth characteristics and the capacity to increase dividends.

Schwartz contrasted that approach with waiting for a company to accumulate decades of dividend increases. Newly paying companies could enter the strategy if they met its other quality and growth criteria, giving the portfolio a different composition from screens built around a long payment history.

Questions and answers

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Questions about the August 28, 2024 episode and the fund structures discussed.

What currency distinction did Schwartz make between DXJ and EWJ?

EWJ retained exposure to the yen alongside Japanese equities, while DXJ sought to hedge the yen’s movement against the US dollar. DXJ also had its own stock-selection approach, including an exporter tilt.

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What did Schwartz mean by carry in the Japan discussion?

He was referring to the interest-rate differential involved in hedging the yen against the dollar. He expected that relationship to remain beneficial, but his projected contribution depended on future rates rather than a guaranteed fund payment.

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Was DGRW designed to maximize current dividend yield?

Schwartz emphasized quality, profitability and growth characteristics rather than the highest current yield. He explained that a newly paying company could qualify without first building a decades-long record of dividend increases, provided it met the other criteria.

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Adapted by Stock Market TV Editorial from the original video. Source date: . Article published: .