Takeaways

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  • Roque expected an oversold rebound but identified S&P 500 resistance at 5,400–5,500 as an area where he wanted to sell.
  • His daily and weekly oversold readings differed from the monthly picture; a strong rally would not by itself prove a lasting low.
  • He watched JPMorgan Chase and the investment-banking group for confirmation, including the possibility of a later retest.
  • His longer-term recovery test was an S&P move above its 12-month average followed by that average turning upward.

John Roque expected U.S. stocks to bounce when he joined the Morning Show on April 22, 2025. He also expected to sell into that strength. The distinction was central to his conversation with JC Parets, Steve Strazza and Spencer Israel: an oversold market could rally sharply without having repaired the damage that put it in a bear market.

Roque’s preferred S&P 500 selling area was 5,400 to 5,500. He chose it because earlier trading and downside gaps had left resistance there. It was a prospective response to a rebound, not a claim that he had already executed a trade at those prices.

An oversold reading depended on the time frame

Roque described the S&P 500 and Nasdaq as oversold on daily and weekly measures. Those conditions supported a bounce. His monthly S&P 500 measure, however, had not reached the same state.

He used a percentage-based MACD measure to compare declines across history. He acknowledged that the monthly reading might never become oversold. The different readings did not force a single forecast; they explained why he could expect near-term strength and remain cautious about the larger trend.

The speed of a rally would not settle the question either. Roque recalled substantial rebounds inside the extended Nasdaq decline of the early 2000s. His point was that a powerful advance could occur while a bear market was still in progress.

Strazza asked whether an S&P recovery above 5,600 would be a constructive change. Roque returned to what he needed to see from the market rather than treating the bounce itself as proof of a new trend.

Financials were part of the confirmation process

Parets asked about banks holding up better than other groups around the world. Roque separated the examples. European banks had been resilient, while U.S. regional banks and Japanese banks had already suffered meaningful declines.

JPMorgan Chase was his preferred individual bellwether. He compared its direction with the S&P 500 and regarded disagreement between the two as a reason to question the index move. That was a check within his process, not a substitute for looking at the rest of the market.

He also reviewed earlier declines in investment-banking stocks. In his historical comparison, those episodes had included a second downward leg. He was therefore watching for a rebound followed by another test, rather than assuming the first low had finished the work.

A successful retest in the group would improve his assessment. Until that happened, the relative resilience of some financial stocks did not remove his concern about the broad market.

A signal in bonds did not automatically become a stock trade

Roque challenged the habit of using one asset’s movement to anticipate a different asset’s next move. Earlier relationships could be useful, but he did not think they should override the evidence in the instrument being traded.

He used the spread between two-year and ten-year Treasury yields as an example. If the two-year yield was falling faster, his first interest was the corresponding opportunity in two-year Treasury prices. He did not want to ignore that move while waiting for a regional-bank trade that might never develop.

If the yield-curve change eventually mattered to equities, he expected evidence to appear in equity prices. He could evaluate it then.

That approach also informed his discussion of averages. A market need not stop exactly at its historical mean. Roque wanted the analyst to specify the time frame and range, and allow for movement beyond the average rather than treat it as a guaranteed destination.

He preferred a clearer trend to the exact bottom

Roque described a simple longer-term test: after a bear market, he wanted the S&P 500 to regain its 12-month moving average and that average to turn upward. Waiting for repair meant giving up the possibility of buying the precise low. He was comfortable with that trade-off.

He used sports analogies to explain the preference. The spectacular, difficult play might earn attention, but he wanted repeatable opportunities with a clearer setup. The hosts also distinguished a profitable outcome from a sound original decision.

Gold offered another application. Roque saw strength in gold across several currencies, while broader commodity participation remained incomplete. He would welcome more groups joining the advance, but did not want to buy an unrelated commodity merely because gold was rising. The next market still had to supply its own evidence.

Questions and answers

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Questions answered in the original 2025-04-22 episode.

Why did Roque choose 5,400–5,500 on the S&P 500?

He identified earlier trading and downside gaps as sources of resistance in that region. He expected a bounce but wanted to sell into that prospective resistance test.

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What did he want to see before treating the market as repaired?

His longer-term framework looked for the S&P 500 to regain its 12-month moving average and for the average to slope upward. He accepted missing the exact low in exchange for that evidence.

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How did he use JPMorgan Chase in his analysis?

He treated JPMorgan as a market bellwether and compared its direction with the S&P 500. Divergence between them prompted him to question the index move rather than accept it without confirmation.

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Adapted by Stock Market TV Editorial from the original video. Source date: . Article published: .